For decades, mainland Southeast Asia has been a center for transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, money laundering and, most recently, online scam operations. After several governments in Southeast Asia cracked down on criminal gangs over the last decade, many of them — particularly those that are Chinese-run — have relocated to the Golden Triangle region, where the borders of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet. Some have also moved to autonomous Special Economic Zones, such as those in Laos and Myanmar, that are in some cases under the rule of local militias and where regulations are limited. China has been watching these developments closely.

Beijing considers mainland Southeast Asia as a “pilot zone” for its Global Security Initiative (GSI), which Chinese leader Xi Jinping launched in 2022. The GSI represents Beijing’s strategic blueprint for redefining global security architecture, positioning itself as an alternative to the U.S.-dominated order. It emphasizes China’s enduring security principles and norms as a framework for addressing contemporary challenges, particularly those aligned with its critical national interests. In Southeast Asia, China focuses on “jointly safeguard[ing] regional peace and stability” under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework, specifically emphasizing non-traditional security issues like transnational crime and cyber security.

How China collaborates with mainland Southeast Asian countries in addressing these non-traditional security threats is worth watching, as it may demonstrate how Beijing plans to implement the GSI in the region and beyond in the years to come.

Myanmar as a Prime Hub of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia

Myanmar has become the prime destination for criminal groups, particularly after its 2021 coup. Lawlessness in many parts of the country provides a suitable condition for running illicit activities, as criminal organizations exploit Myanmar’s conflicting parties’ dire need for arms to strengthen their felonious businesses.

Shwe Kokko, a town in Myawaddy Township located at the border between Thailand and Myanmar, under control by local militias, has seen the growth of massive compounds and buildings housing online gambling, scamming and human trafficking. Criminal activities in the town and adjacent areas have expanded massively since the 2021 coup and more so after Operation 1027, when a group of ethnic armed organizations known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched an offensive against Myanmar military outposts in the northern Shan State bordering China, leading to the raids of multiple scam centers and allowing China to purge several kingpins. Many gangs then moved to Myawaddy Township, the Thai-Myanmar border, to continue their operations. However, the order for scam gangs to move away from Shwe Kokko within six months, between May 1 and October 31, 2024, forced these gangs to relocate to other lawless areas along the Thai-Myanmar border closer to Payathonzu.

The flourishment of criminal activities in the Thai-Myanmar border poses a direct security threat to the region. Citizens of various nations — including China, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and as far as Ethiopia, Kenya and Brazil — have been offered lucrative jobs supposedly in Thailand before getting trafficked to the area. Diplomatic missions in Bangkok and Yangon have struggled to free victims and bring them home.

The Chinese government is no different. Beijing has become deeply involved in campaigns to release its own nationals trapped in criminal compounds and suppress networks that run operatives, especially online and telecommunication scamming targeting people in China. The Chinese government has worked closely with mainland Southeast Asian governments to combat transnational criminal activities in those areas, arguably providing a pretext for China to gradually assert more political influence over the region under its GSI framework.

Thailand, Southeast Asian Governments and China’s GSI

Thailand could be pivotal for GSI implementation in mainland Southeast Asia. In recent years, Chinese criminal groups have posed increasing non-traditional security threats to the kingdom. Thailand is also geographically close to other criminal hotspots in the region, such as the border town of Shwe Kokko, which are of great concern to China.

The Chinese government has adopted the language of “fraternity” to persuade Thailand to support the GSI framework. A few days after Xi introduced the GSI, China’s ambassador to Thailand, Han Zhiqiang, issued a statement attempting to convince the Thai government of the role it could play in cooperating with China under the GSI framework. Han stressed, in very broad terms, the long friendship between the two countries and the need to work together to preserve an “East Asia Oasis,” where a safe environment for peaceful development is cherished. A meeting between then Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha and Xi in November 2022 led the two countries to agree to “explore cooperation under the GSI” and “maintain close communication and coordination” to address mutual security challenges.

In all subsequent high-level bilateral meetings, GSI implementation has been one of the discussion topics. An October 2023 meeting between then Thai premier Srettha Thavisin and Xi also resulted in the commitments of both countries to deepen cooperation to combat transnational crime, particularly “drug trafficking, human trafficking, online gambling, online, digital and telecommunication scams, money laundering, and terrorism” — which are significant non-traditional security challenges under the scope of GSI.

From my perspective, Beijing’s implementation of the GSI in mainland Southeast Asia, in collaboration with Bangkok, gradually crystallized with crackdowns on scammers, online fraud and human trafficking. Many Chinese are greatly concerned over these issues because of the 2023 blockbuster movie “No More Bets.” The movie also caught Thailand’s attention, as Bangkok is worried that widespread criminal activities will negatively impact Chinese tourism in Thailand. Beijing and Bangkok have deepened information exchanges and joint investigations on criminal figures.

Beyond bilateral cooperation, Beijing has also invited Thailand to work on addressing non-traditional security threats under the GSI framework at a sub-regional level with the participation of other countries, including Myanmar and Laos. Throughout 2023, the four parties developed multiple initiatives and conducted joint operations to suppress online gambling, scamming and human trafficking. In March 2023, representatives from China’s Ministry of Public Safety, Royal Thai Police and the Myanmar Police Force met for the first trilateral consultation on human trafficking, aiming to combat the growing activities of traffickers in Thai-Myanmar border areas. China, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand agreed in August 2023 to establish a joint operations center to combat online scamming in the region. Despite these initiatives, the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar recognized that criminal operations remain rampant and urged Naypyidaw to do more.

A March 2024 joint operation also secured the release of a significant number of people from compounds in the Myawaddy Township, including nearly 1,000 Chinese nationals whom Thailand helped return to China. Whether those people are treated as victims in China remains unknown, as Beijing refers to them as suspects, but reports indicated clearly that Chinese scammers would be arrested and punished according to Chinese laws.

China’s Deepening Engagement and Influence in Southeast Asia

Chinese crime syndicates’ widespread presence in Southeast Asia impacts China and its reputation on the global stage. This situation arguably provides a pretext for China to implement the GSI framework in the region. Beijing frames the effort in the name of “fraternal” partnership pursuits and leverages regional security challenges and concern over their impacts on its nationals to assert operational influence, primarily through the formation of joint operations or task forces. The pattern of GSI implementation in mainland Southeast Asia could pave the way for Beijing’s long-term involvement in maneuvering the security architecture in the region. Through this effort, implementing the GSI serves China’s primary purpose: cultivating its leadership in the security realm with Chinese rules.